The Norwegian population will pass through an ageing process during the next decades which causes that the old-age-dependency ratio rises from currently 22 per cent up to 38 per cent in 2050 and 47 per cent in 2100. This ageing population induces increasing expenditures on oldage and disability pensions together with health and long-term care benefits while the public revenues from wage taxes and social contributions will decrease. At the same time, the revenues from petroleum activities decline. Therefore, it is unclear if the Norwegian fiscal policy is really sustainable or not even despite the formidable current conditions with a budget surplus of nearly 14 per cent of GDP and a net wealth of 26 per cent of GDP. Is Norway over-consuming its petroleum wealth?
Introduction
In a paper in 1993 Auerbach et al. (1993) asked the question: "Norway: Is the nation overconsuming its petroleum wealth?". They analyzed this question with the method of generational accounting and back then their answer was: yes, Norway does over-consume. And this could still hold today as Norway still has one of the most generous public pension systems and life expectancy at births rose from 1992 (their base year) to today significantly from 77.3 to 80.5 and is expected to increase even further. At the same time the fertility rate, although close to the natural reproduction rate, stagnates at 1.9 children per fertile woman. However, things also have changed in the other direction: Firstly, net migration hit a record high in 2007 with 40,000 people, most of them relatively young and well educated. Secondly, the Government Pension Fund (GPF) became over the last decade the very role model how unfunded pay-as-you-gosystems could become partially funded. And thirdly, and possibly most important of all, oil prices went through the roof and will probably continue rise even further. In 1992, the base year of the Auerbach et al. (1993) paper, direct and indirect taxes related to petroleum activities were Generational Accounts for Norway were not only calculated by Auerbach et al (1993) but also by Steigum (1996) , Steigum and Gjersem (1999) . Steigum (2002) and Gjersem (2002) while certain aspects of generational accounting were also included in some National Budget reports.
However, our goal is not only to update these studies with the newest developments (see above) but also to put a focus on the intergenerational dimension of the oil wealth and the related pension fund.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes briefly the method of Generational Accounting and the calculation of the sustainability indicators used. The method of Generational Accounting was introduced during the early nineties to estimate both explicit and implicit debt of public coffers in the long run. The sources of data used for these calculations are reported in section 3. Generational Accounting needs three kinds of data, a population projection, age-and sex-specific profiles and a general government budget of a certain base-year. Furthermore, we discuss in section 3 our choice for global parameters (growth and discount rates) and the influence of the public oil-revenues on the general budget. In section 4 we provide the results of the Generational Accounting analyses using different kinds of sustainability indicators.
Furthermore we illustrate the findings of the sensitivity analyses, wherein we analyze the effects of different population scenarios and the choice of several parameters. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
The Methodology of Generational Accounting
To measure the sustainability of a country's public sector we use the method of Generational Accounting developed by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991 , 1992 and 1994 . In contrast to traditional budget indicators which are based on annual cash flow budgets, Generational Accounting is founded on the intertemporal budget constraint and therefore the long-term implications of a current policy can be computed. 1 The intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector, expressed in present value terms of a base-year is: b
(1) 
.
In equation (2), denotes the average net tax paid in year by a representative member of the generation born in year , whereas stands for the number of members of a generation
The further description of the methodology of Generational Accounting is mainly based on Raffelhüschen (1999) and Bonin (2001) . For an analytical derivation of the intertemporal budget constraint see Fetzer (2006) or Fetzer (2006) . Hagist (2008) gives an overview about the empirical studies with generational accounting along with a discussion concerning critical points in theoretical as well as empirical terms. born in year who survives until year . To compute the remaining lifetime net payments of living generations, the future demographic structure is specified conducting long-term population forecasts.
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Typically, Generational Accountants disaggregate equation (2) even further. To incorporate gender-specific differences in average tax payments and transfer receipts by age, separate aggregation of the average net taxes paid by male and female cohort members is required. The products aggregated in equation (2) represent the net taxes paid by all members of generation in year . For generations born prior to the base-year the summation starts from year b, while for future born cohorts, the summation starts in year . Irrespective of the year of birth, all payments are discounted back to the base-year b by application of a real interest rate .
The age-specific net tax payment in year of agents born in year k can be decomposed as
stands for the average tax or transfer of type paid or received in year s by agents born in year , thus of age .
indicates a tax payment, whereas defines a transfer.
Applying the method of Generational Accounting it is conventionally assumed that initial fiscal policy and economic behavior are constant over time. Under this condition it is possible to project future average tax payments and transfer receipts per capita from the base-year age profile of payments according to
where g represents the annual rate of productivity growth. Equation (4) assigns to each agent of age s-k in year s the tax and transfer payment observed for agents of the same age in base-year b, uprated for gains in productivity. The base-year cross section of age-specific tax and transfer payments per capita is generally determined in two steps. First, the relative position of age cohorts between themselves in the tax and transfer system is estimated from micro-data profiles. In a second step the relative age profiles are re-evaluated proportionally to fit the expenditure and tax revenues of the base-year. 2 In case of an isolated analysis of public subsystems like health care or public pension as conducted in the following chapters, i is just chosen so that all relevant payment streams are included in the analysis.
For living and future generations, division of the aggregate remaining lifetime net tax payments by the number of cohort members alive in year s defines the cohort's Generational Account in year s:
Generational Accounts are constructed in a purely forward-looking manner, only the taxes paid and the transfers received in or after the base-year are considered. As a consequence, Generational Accounts cannot be compared across living generations because they incorporate effects of differential lifetime. One may compare, however, the Generational Accounts of baseyear and future born agents, who are observed over their entire lifecycle.
To illustrate the fiscal burden of current fiscal policy we use seven sustainability indicators:
3 The starting point for the first indicators are the intertemporal public liabilities which can be computed by the assumption that the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector (1) is violated:
The amount of intertemporal public liabilities measures aggregate unfunded claims on future budgets, assuming that the present policy will hold for the future. The first sustainability indicator, the fiscal gap ( b FG ), can be derived if the intertemporal public liabilities are set in relation to base-year's GDP ( ). This indicator is akin to the debt quota well known since the Maastricht treaty but it addresses the debt which will occur in the future and in the past:
How the policy adjustment required to redeem intertemporal public liabilities will affect generations' fiscal burdens is uncertain. For illustrative purposes, Generational Accounting typically assigns the entire adjustment to future generations which is equivalent to k > b. All tax payments made by members of future born cohorts are adjusted proportionally with the help of a uniform scaling factor θ . The factor θ is set to ensure balance of the intertemporal public budget defined in equation (1): (4). Computing the average age-specific net taxes paid by representative future born agents, the burden for future generations can be illustrated as an absolute difference between the Generational Account of the base-year agent and the Generational Account of the one year after base-year born agent. This is our second sustainability indicator, the future generations' burden:
The third indicator that illustrates the burden of current fiscal policy is the revenue gap. In this case the scaling factor rev θ θ = reflects the enhancement of age-specific revenues in per cent for all generations which is necessary to close the intertemporal public budget constraint. It can also be interpreted as the ratio of the intertemporal public liabilities to the present value of all age-specific revenues of the fiscal system : like health benefits in per cent for all generations that is necessary to close the intertemporal public budget constraint. Constructing the revenue and transfer gap, we implicitly assume that the government is able to enforce an immediate adjustment of all taxes and contributions or transfers respectively.
As Benz and Fetzer (2006) have shown all the used indicators are computed with an infinite time horizon. In the practical calculation all relevant variables like population or cohorts' tax payments are projected for 300 years from the base-year on. Afterwards a geometrical serial is used to determine the remaining net tax payments. The choice of 300 periods is nearly completely arbitrary and just reflects a good approximation point for our analysis.
Data and Assumptions
To compute Generational Accounts and to calculate the described indicators, a population projection is needed. Furthermore the calculations require the expenditures and revenues of the Norwegian public sector in 2007, age-sex-profiles for the different expenditure and revenue types and a growth rate of the productivity as well as a discount rate. The population projection in the following is calculated with a demographic program developed by Bonin (2001) .
Population Projection
Generational Accounting requires detailed population projections, which distinguish between Table 1 shows those central assumptions of the three scenarios. In the following the future size and structure of the Norwegian population can be anticipated for all three different demographic scenarios. The outcomes of these projections are shown in figure   1 . Compared to the official calculations of Statistics Norway (2008a), we exactly hit the Norwegian population in 2050 within our medium projection.
In the medium variant of the Norwegian population projection which is shown in Figure 1 the population grows over the projection horizon. After this scenario the population increases from 4.7 million in 2007 to 6.3 million in 2100. The high variant causes a constant increase in terms of population. The population rises to 6.7 million until 2050 and 9.5 million until 2100. Only the low variant contains a decrease of the population. Until it reaches the year 2036, the population grows also in this scenario due to the increasing life expectancy of both men and women, afterwards a shrinkage process begins which causes a population of 5 million in 2050 and 3.9 million in 2100. For the following analysis we take the medium variant as our standard scenario if not stated differently. Outcomes for the two other scenarios can be found in sector 5.2 of this paper. 2007. This is caused by the Second World War. However, the effects of this war for the population structure in Norway are much less than in most other middle-European nations. In the following it came to the so-called "baby-boom" which was characterized by birth-rates of almost three children per woman. At the end of the 1960s the so-called "pill kink" finished this boom and caused a massive decrease of the population. Due to increasing fertility rates after 1985 the size of the population rises for the cohorts of the 22-year-olds and younger. The reasons for this increase are difficult to define, because it did not happen in most other middleEuropean countries. It can be assumed that it is mainly caused by a higher generosity in the Norwegian family transfer system. One can see on the basis of figure 2 that the absolute size of the Norwegian population will increase in the future. Especially the number of members of cohorts above the age of 60 years will constantly grow, while the size of the younger cohorts will be almost stable. This is mainly caused by the augmentation of the life expectancy in Norway combined with more or less sufficient fertility rates. How and to what extent this future changes in the population structure include a change of the average age and especially of the ratios between the cohorts can be demonstrated by the old-age-dependency-ratio. This is defined by the ratio between members of cohorts older than 66 years to the sum of all generations between 20 and 66years. 4 This ratio shows more or less the proportion between the old part of the society and the younger working part. Therefore the future development of the old-age-dependency-ratio gives a first hint of how social security systems organized in a pay as you go-pattern will be imbalanced in the future. 4 In the literature one find various different definitions with different age groups or restricted groups like working people under a certain age. However, in the case of Norway, the official retirement age is 67 years even when the actual retirement age is more likely around 63 years. According to official prognoses of the OECD (2007) this ratio will shrink onto 0.4 per cent until 2060 taking into account price as well as output effects. Figure 4 show the assumed development of oil revenues in relation to GDP which will be used in the forthcoming calculations. 
Interest and Growth Assumptions
Because of the infinite time-horizon it is quite difficult to define the constant interest and growth rate, which are needed to predict the future revenues and expenditures of the public sector and to analyze the sustainability of this system. Norway's government assumes for its calculation of the present value of the GPF a standardized growth rate (g) of 2.0 per cent and a discount rate (r) of 4.0 per cent with which we follow in our standard scenario except for two exceptions. To distribute the wealth of the GPF and the public debt over generations, it is necessary to consider the dividends of the GPF and the interest paid for the public debt as flows rather than just take the stocks into account (which would be sufficient to calculate the fiscal gap). However, with a discount rate we would greatly overestimate the public debt and underestimate the wealth of the GPF. That is why we calculate internal discount rates for these two budget items. Taking the formula for an eternal rent, the internal discount rate of the GPF is 4.4 per cent and for the public debt 2.45 per cent respectively. In addition these two budget items along with the oil revenues (see section 4.2) will not grow according to the technical progress and the demographic development but only to the discount rate so their present value is equal in every scenario (however, not their outcome per head logically). Additionally it is necessary to undertake appropriate sensitivity analysis to minimize possible empirical uncertainties which are caused by the unsuitable choice of the parameters.
4.
The sustainability of Norway's fiscal system
As described above, the Norwegian state is in the comfortable situation to have an explicit budget surplus at present. But this is mainly caused by the high oil revenues of the public sector and therefore it is unrealistic to assume that this will be constant in the future. Furthermore, the Norwegian population will getting older. Because of the comparatively high fertility rates in Norway, this ageing-process will be quite modest. However, it exists and causes an expanding number of retirees, which are amongst others entitled to receive benefits out of the public pension system and which are responsible for a major part of the public health care costs. The financial consequences of the described revenue-effect and the ageing-effect can be calculated by the method of Generational Accounting. The results of these calculations are shown in the following. Figure 5 presents the first outcome of our analysis, namely the Generational Accounts of Norwegians distinguished by gender in our baseyear, 2007, according to our standard scenario (medium variant, g=2%, r=4%). At a first glance, one can recognize the classical result of a sinusshaped pattern which is very common in OECD countries with strong pay-as-you-go systems.
Generational Accounts
The young between 0 and 45 years finance the elderly generations from 50 years and older. Surely, this outcome depends on the one hand highly on our chosen micro-profiles but also on the other hand to the indisputable higher life expectancy of women and their lower income on average. 5 Sadly, a sensitivity analysis concerning our incidence assumptions (via the microprofiles) is yet not possible as better data at least to our knowledge is not available. Source: Own calculations 5 For example women receive the major share of family benefits while one could also assume that the incidence is really based on the child or the family (husband, wife, children) as a whole.
The even more remarkable result, however, is the account of the present average newborn. Even little, it has a positive sign (19, 121 NOK) . Comparing this to the generational accounts of Austria, France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the U.S. presented in Hagist et al. (2008) , it is a unique pattern. However, this only holds if one accounts for the petroleum revenues and the dividends of the net wealth (GPF minus public debt) and only until for newborns in 2007 as newborns in 2008 are already starting their life with a net transfer of 34,252 NOK in the standard scenario.
As one can see in figure 6 , Generational Accounts of every generation are significant lower without these two sources of funding. Looking only at the core public finances without oil and the generation fund the pattern we see in other countries holds also for Norway. As one cannot compare Generational Accounts between living generations, it is not clear from figure 6 which generations are benefiting the most from Norway's petroleum wealth. Therefore we compute annuities of the difference between two scenarios (e.g. the account of the 50 years old in the "Total" scenario minus the account of the 50 years old in the "…+without net wealth" scenario) weighted with the age-specific life expectancy. The results of this analysis can be seen in figure 7. While the GPF (minus the public debt) really distributes the dividends evenly across generations, oil revenues if they would be part of the general budget, would majorly benefit the living older generations. However, this is a flaw in our analysis as we take the petroleum revenues as "normal" tax revenues. However, current Norwegian policy attributes these revenues directly to the GPF, so if this policy is handled properly it could really benefit all generations equally. Consequently the implicit debt of Norwegian fiscal policy (taxes not related to oil, social security contributions, expenditures for health and public pension, etc.) is 170.9 per cent of GDP. So it can be stated that while the Norwegian public sector as a whole is in a relatively comfortable position, the core fiscal policy itself is clearly not sustainable. A detailed description of the Norwegian sustainability gap and the multiple components is shown in table 3. Our second indicator is the future generation's burden. To calculate this indicator, the intertemporal public liabilities and the number of people in future generations are set in proportion to each other (equation 9). This indicator implies that the entire adjustment assigns to future generations. The burden for future generations can be illustrated as an absolute difference between the generational account of the base-year and the generational account of the one year after base-year born agent (both not including petroleum revenues, fund assets or public debt). The future born generation in Norway receive 46,600 NOK per person more in transfers over their entire life-cycle than they will pay in taxes. On the other hand, the base-year born agent gets a net-transfer over his/hers remaining life cycle of about 114,500 NOK.
Therefore, the future born agent has to carry a small burden compared to the corresponding living generation. This is also reflected in our last two sustainability indicators, the revenue and transfer gap. Norway's government would have to raise all taxes (except those on petroleum activities) by 0.7 per cent or could decrease all transfers by 0.7 per cent.
Sensitivity Analysis
To analyze the sensitivity of our results relating to our exogenous parameters interest and growth rate, and r g , and to our different population projections we calculate 15 different cases. Except our standard scenario, we test four more different settings around this combination: g = 1.5 vs. =4.0 per cent, r g = 2.5 vs. = 4 per cent, r g = 2.0 vs. = 3.5 per cent and r g = 2.0 vs. = 4.5 per cent. Furthermore, we distinguish, how discussed above, between three possible population scenarios medium, high and low variant. Table 5 shows the sustainability gap for all possible population scenarios combined with the described growth and interest rate settings. How can be easily seen, the extent of the fiscal gap and in the case of Norway also its quality (debt or wealth) depends on the difference between the growth and interest rate. As the spread widens the fiscal gap decrease, i.e. is better, in all of the three scenarios. Regarding our three population scenarios it can be stated that the low variant is the most sustainable one when the growth-interest-spread is low. The most intergenerationally unbalanced situation using the indicator fiscal gap is therefore achieved by the high variant combined with the smallest difference between growth and discount rate ( g = 2.5 vs. = 4 per cent). However, this changes given larger growth-interest-spreads. The intuition behind this is probably the effects of migration. As seen above this differ quite between the scenarios. When the growth-interestspread is low, the relative weight of petroleum revenues increases. As supply of petroleum is 7 For details see table A1 in the appendix. Our ranking from above is also confirmed given both the revenue and transfer gap. 8 For a description of other western Generational Accounts, see Hagist (2008) .
Comparison to official fiscal sustainability analysis
As Norway is the only country to our knowledge that reports some measurement of fiscal sustainability over the long-run in the official budget, it is clearly of interest if our numbers are comparable to the ones that are announced in the budget of 2007. 11 So in sum these two effects should cancel themselves out at least to some degree.
Rather minor effects should have the probably slightly different demographic projections and micro-profiles as at least for the demographics the key parameters (expected fertility, expected life expectancy and expected net migration) are the same.
As the Ministry of Finance (2006) does not report fiscal gaps in our definition from equation (7), we have to transform our fiscal gap to an annuity. Given our model and assumptions about growth and discount rates, the Norwegian government would have to save 17.3 billion NOK every year. If we assume a (nominal) growth rate of 3.5 percent and a (nominal) discount rate of 6 percent (the assumptions of the Ministry of Finance (2006) 5.
Summary and Conclusion
The Norwegian population will pass through an ageing process during the next decades which causes that the old-age-dependency ratio rises from currently 22 per cent up to 38 per cent in 2050 and 47 per cent in 2100. This ageing population induces increasing expenditures on oldage and disability pensions together with health and long-term care benefits while the public revenues from wage taxes and social contributions will decrease. At the same time, the revenues from petroleum activities decline. Therefore, it is unclear if the Norwegian fiscal policy is really sustainable or not even despite the formidable current conditions with a budget surplus of nearly 14 per cent of GDP and a net wealth of 26 per cent of GDP. Is Norway over-consuming its petroleum wealth?
The answer to this question is an economist's favorite: It depends. As it turns out Norway comes as close to sound public coffers as a nation with such a welfare state gets. Given that our scenario concerning the petroleum wealth is probably rather conservative given current developments of the oil price, Norway should have even a little scope to maneuver with only smaller cuts of social programs compared to other countries as Germany or the U.S. However, given that parameters are uncertain and also the demographic development remains only theoretical given, Norway should be cautious. Of our calculated 15 cases of different demographic developments and different growth and discount assumptions, Norway ends up in eight of them in an unsustainable situation. As historical evidence and international comparison shows, reforms are much easier to implement while losers of reforms can at least to a certain amount be compensated.
To be fair, Norway seems already on this track. The existence of the Government Pension Fund alone seems not only to restrict government spending but also spreading the petroleum wealth equally over Norway's living as well as future generations. If the petroleum wealth would be consumed as it comes, elderly generations would benefit three times more than younger generations comparing annuities. Furthermore, women are encouraged to work more which would clearly benefit the public finances in the long-term as by now only young men carry the burden of the social welfare state. Last but not least, Norway's parliament passed a public pension reform in 2007 starting 2010 which is aimed to give incentives for Norwegians to work longer and which will take the rising life expectancy into account when calculating pension benefits. How this will affect our generational accounting analysis will be a topic for future research. 
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